A Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics by Perlman, Andrew M.
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 90 | Issue 4 Article 6
10-1-2015
A Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics
Andrew M. Perlman
Suffolk University Law School, aperlman@suffolk.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Commons, Legal Profession Commons,
and the Social Psychology Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Perlman, Andrew M. (2015) "A Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 90: Iss. 4, Article 6.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol90/iss4/6
A Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics 
ANDREW M. PERLMAN* 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 1639 
I. THE OBJECTIVE-PARTISAN ASSUMPTION IN LEGAL ETHICS THEORY ............... 1643 
A. THE DOMINANT VIEW’S OBJECTIVE-PARTISAN ASSUMPTION ............... 1644 
B. THE CRITIQUES OF ZEALOUS ADVOCACY .............................................. 1646 
II. LESSONS FROM SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ABOUT OBJECTIVITY ........................... 1647 
A. AN INTRODUCTION TO RELEVANT CONCEPTS FROM SOCIAL      
PSYCHOLOGY ............................................................................................. 1647 
B. THE PARTISANSHIP PROBLEM ................................................................ 1651 
III. REVISITING THE OBJECTIVE-PARTISAN ASSUMPTION IN LEGAL ETHICS     
THEORY ............................................................................................................... 1658 
A. AN ANALOGY TO BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS ......................................... 1658 
B. LEGAL ETHICS THEORY AND THE PROBLEM OF AMBIGUITY .................. 1660 
IV. TOWARDS A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LEGAL ETHICS .................................. 1662 
A. CONTEXT-DEPENDENT PRESCRIPTIONS AND THE IMPORTANCE OF 
DEBIASING ................................................................................................. 1663 
B. DEBIASING THROUGH SUBSTANTIVE LAW ............................................. 1664 
C. THE ROLE OF DISCRETION IN PROFESSIONAL RULEMAKING .................. 1667 
D. TEACHING COGNITIVE BIAS IN LEGAL EDUCATION ............................... 1668 
CONCLUSION........................................................................................................ 1669 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a lawyer who discovers that a client has several smoking-gun documents 
that will doom the client’s case if produced in discovery. Also assume the client tells 
the lawyer to use all lawful methods to avoid producing the information. Some legal 
ethicists argue that the lawyer should comply with the client’s instruction and pursue 
every permissible tactic, that is, go right up to the line but not cross it.1 Critics of this 
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 * Professor of Law, Suffolk University Law School. B.A., Yale College; J.D., Harvard 
Law School; LL.M., Columbia Law School. I am grateful to several friends and colleagues 
who gave me valuable feedback on early drafts of this Article, including Tigran Eldred, 
Russell Gold, Bruce Green, Jan Jacobowitz, David McGowan, Mark Rogerson, Patrick Shin, 
Joshua Silverstein, Keith Swisher, and Bradley Wendel. I also benefited a great deal from the 
assistance of research librarian Ellen Delaney and law students Dahlia Ali, Nicole Annmarie 
Faille, Cody Friesz, Jared Heit, Micah-Shalom Kesselman, Christopher Miller, and Matthew 
J. Smith. Finally, I received very helpful feedback during faculty workshops at Albany Law 
School, St. John’s Law School, and Suffolk University Law School. 
 1. See, e.g., DAVID A. BINDER, PAUL BERGMAN, PAUL R. TREMBLAY & IAN S. WEINSTEIN, 
LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (3d ed. 2011); MONROE H. 
FREEDMAN & ABBE SMITH, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS’ ETHICS (4th ed. 2010); W. BRADLEY 
WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010); Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The 
Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Stephen L. 
Pepper, The Lawyer's Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and Some Possibilities, 
1986 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 613. 
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so-called dominant view suggest that the lawyer should take into account other 
considerations, such as the interests of justice or morality.2 
One important practical problem with these competing prescriptions is that they 
do not help lawyers avoid unethical conduct. For example, even though the dominant 
view requires lawyers to protect the potentially discoverable documents only to the 
extent permissible under the law, lawyers who claim to be following the dominant 
view often cross the line.3 Similarly, prosecutors who are committed to the pursuit 
of justice regularly fail to comply with their constitutional obligations to disclose 
material, exculpatory information to defense counsel.4 These failures raise an 
important question: Why do lawyers who subjectively believe they are complying 
with prevailing theories of legal ethics—whether the dominant view or its 
alternatives—fail to apply the theories in the manner scholars intend? 
This Article suggests that the answer lies in social psychology. A vast body of 
research reveals that situational factors, like placing a lawyer in a partisan role, can 
result in behavior that is inconsistent with conventional ethics theories.5 This Article 
suggests that legal ethicists can develop more accurate and useful theories by 
accounting for the ways in which partisanship distorts objectivity, just as behavioral 
economists have drawn on social psychology to develop more accurate and useful 
understandings of economics.6 
Part I of this Article offers a brief overview of the well-established debate over 
the lawyer’s professional role and contends that existing theories rest on an 
unacknowledged assumption about human behavior. The assumption, referred to 
here as the objective-partisan assumption, is that lawyers are capable of acting as 
partisans—being affiliated with one side of a matter—while remaining sufficiently 
objective about their own conduct to resolve ethical dilemmas in the manner 
theorists prescribe. 
Part II contends that the objective-partisan assumption is flawed in light of what 
social science tells us about partisanship’s distorting influence. For example, one 
recent study showed that accountants are more likely to find that a company’s 
financial reports comply with generally accepted accounting principles when the 
accountants are placed in the role of the company’s accountant than when they are 
assigned the role of the accountant for an outside investor in the same company.7 
In other words, the accountants had some difficulty retaining their objectivity when 
                                                                                                                 
 
 2. See DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1988); WILLIAM H. 
SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LAWYERS’ ETHICS (1998). 
 3. See John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery's Fatal Flaws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 
505, 524–34 (2000); Barbara J. Gorham, Note, Fisons: Will It Tame the Beast of Discovery 
Abuse?, 69 WASH. L. REV. 765 (1994). 
 4. See Editorial, Rampant Prosecutorial Misconduct, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2014, at SR 
10; Brad Heath & Kevin McCoy, Prosecutors’ Conduct Can Tip the Scales, USA TODAY, 
Sept. 23, 2010, at A1; see also Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decision Making: 
Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587 (2006). 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See generally DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011) (offering an 
overview and history of the field). 
 7. Don A. Moore, Lloyd Tanlu & Max H. Bazerman, Conflict of Interest and the 
Intrusion of Bias, 5 JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 37 (2010). 
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they were placed in a partisan position.8 Studies reveal that lawyers have trouble 
remaining objective under similar circumstances. For instance, lawyers have a 
tendency to offer different assessments of the objective value of a case depending 
on whether they are asked to represent the plaintiff or the defendant.9 These studies, 
and others like them,10 suggest that partisanship has a tendency to distort 
professional judgments. 
Part III contends that, in light of these findings, prevailing legal ethics theories 
contain questionable prescriptions. Consider, for example, the dominant view of legal 
ethics, which posits that lawyers should pursue a client’s demands to the full extent the 
law allows.11 The research on partisanship strongly implies that lawyers who adopt this 
view will have difficulty identifying the line between permissible and impermissible 
advocacy and that compliance with the dominant view will result in misconduct more 
often than dominant-view proponents acknowledge.12 The research also suggests that 
theories critical of the dominant view suffer from similar problems.13 
Part IV explores how behavioral insights could make existing theories more 
realistic and helpful. For instance, theorists could acknowledge that lawyers have 
difficulty making ethical judgments in ambiguous situations and that, in those 
contexts, lawyers should employ debiasing strategies, such as seeking second 
opinions from trusted colleagues who are not working on the same matter or reaching 
out to the ethics committees of local bar associations.14 These debiasing strategies 
are not a panacea (in part because ethical issues are difficult to spot and because 
colleagues can have partisanship biases in favor of the client as well),15 but they can 
increase the likelihood that lawyers will act as legal ethics theorists intend. 
Other strategies include exposing law students to the increasingly vast literature on 
how cognitive errors lead to poor decision making and drafting rules and policies that 
reflect partisanship’s distorting influence. For example, given that prosecutors regularly 
make mistakes when deciding whether to disclose information to a defendant,16 theorists 
                                                                                                                 
 
 8. See id. at 46. 
 9. See Linda Babcock, George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff & Colin Camerer, 
Biased Judgments of Fairness in Bargaining, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 1337 (1995) (finding that 
lawyers’ assessments of the value of a case vary depending on which side the lawyers are 
assigned to represent). 
 10. See infra Part II.B. 
 11. See, e.g., BINDER ET AL., supra note 1; FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 1; Fried, supra 
note 1; Pepper, supra note 1. 
 12. See infra Part II.B. 
 13. See infra Part III.B. 
 14. The recommendation to seek second opinions is not new. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., 
Foreword, The Legal Profession: The Impact of Law and Legal Theory, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 
239, 247 (1998) (“A lawyer confronting something that seems to be an ethics problem should 
consult a colleague about whether there is such a problem and, if so, how she should go about 
resolving it.”). But it has not previously been discussed in the context of the prevailing ethics 
theories. Moreover, prior discussions tend not to draw on social science research, which 
suggests that second opinions offer only a partial solution to the problem. See infra notes 
153–155 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 153–156 and accompanying text. 
 16. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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could prescribe the greater use of an “open-file policy,”17 which gives the accused 
access to all information in the prosecutor’s file. This kind of policy would reduce 
the distorting effect of partisanship and increase the odds that prosecutors will behave 
as theorists prescribe. 
In sum, this Article contends that behavioral research can inform the foundational 
legal ethics debate in ways that have not been fully explored. To be clear, a number 
of scholars have drawn on social psychology to develop many useful insights about 
specific problems in the field of professional responsibility,18 as well as other fields 
                                                                                                                 
 
 17. Ellen Yaroshefsky, Prosecutorial Disclosure Obligations, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1321, 
1330 (2011). 
 18. See, e.g., MILTON C. REGAN JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALL OF A WALL STREET 
LAWYER 291–351 (2004); JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY 
FOR LAWYERS: UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND 
DECISION MAKING 385–416 (2012); Anthony V. Alfieri, The Fall of Legal Ethics and the Rise 
of Risk Management, 96 GEO. L.J. 1909, 1939 (2006) (arguing that risk-management systems 
impede moral decisions by diminishing individual responsibility and inducing moral apathy); 
Lawrence J. Fox, I’m Just an Associate . . . at a New York Firm, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 939 
(2000) (contending that students should be exposed to common social psychology themes in 
legal ethics courses); Neil Hamilton & Verna Monson, The Positive Empirical Relationship of 
Professionalism to Effectiveness in the Practice of Law, 24 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 137, 184–
85 (2011) (arguing that law firm professional-development programs should combat 
organizational cultures’ encouragement of unethical behavior); Art Hinshaw & Jess K. 
Alberts, Doing the Right Thing: An Empirical Study of Attorney Negotiation Ethics, 16 HARV. 
NEGOT. L. REV. 95, 100 (2011) (showing existence of “pervasive cultural and structural 
problem” in how lawyers think about negotiations); Pam Jenoff, Going Native: Incentive, 
Identity, and the Inherent Ethical Problem of In-House Counsel, 114 W. VA. L. REV. 725 
(2012) (arguing that corporate “cultural immersion” makes it difficult for in-house attorneys 
to remain independent); Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411 
(2008) (using social psychology to suggest ways to gain insights into “long-held assumptions” 
about gatekeeping); Donald C. Langevoort, Getting (Too) Comfortable: In-House Lawyers, 
Enterprise Risk, and the Financial Crisis, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 495 (discussing how cognitive 
biases may affect in-house lawyers); Richard Lavoie, Subverting the Rule of Law: The 
Judiciary’s Role in Fostering Unethical Behavior, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. 115, 121–35 (2004) 
(positing that situational factors, not intrinsic characteristics, produce unethical behavior); 
Alan M. Lerner, Using Our Brains: What Cognitive Science and Social Psychology Teach Us 
About Teaching Law Students To Make Ethical, Professionally Responsible, Choices, 23 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 643 (2004) (contending that professional-responsibility courses are not 
training future lawyers to make ethical choices); Leslie C. Levin, Bad Apples, Bad Lawyers 
or Bad Decisionmaking: Lessons from Psychology and from Lawyers in the Dock, 22 GEO. J. 
LEGAL ETHICS 1549 (2009) (reviewing RICHARD L. ABEL, LAWYERS IN THE DOCK: LEARNING 
FROM ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE PROCEEDINGS (2008) and discussing how commitments to a 
course of conduct and self-deception may cause lawyers to act unethically); Robert L. Nelson, 
The Discovery Process As a Circle of Blame: Institutional, Professional, and Socio-Economic 
Factors That Contribute to Unreasonable, Inefficient, and Amoral Behavior in Corporate 
Litigation, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 773 (1998) (identifying factors contributing to unethical 
behavior among civil litigators in large law firms); Andrew M. Perlman, Unethical Obedience 
by Subordinate Attorneys: Lessons from Social Psychology, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 451 (2007) 
(discussing effects of conformity and obedience to authority on subordinate lawyers’ ethics); 
W. Bradley Wendel, Ethical Lawyering in a Morally Dangerous World, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 299 (2006) (highlighting and offering tips for combatting subtle situational forces 
2015] A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LEGAL ETHICS 1643 
 
of law.19 The basic theories of legal ethics, however, have remained largely 
unchallenged and unaffected by developments in social science.20 Moreover, the 
literature has not fully examined how partisanship—a central and ubiquitous feature 
of lawyering—can affect lawyers’ ethical decision making. This Article seeks to fill 
those gaps with the goal of producing more accurate and useful descriptions of, and 
prescriptions for, lawyer conduct. 
I. THE OBJECTIVE-PARTISAN ASSUMPTION IN LEGAL ETHICS THEORY 
Existing theories of legal ethics contain an important and largely unexamined 
assumption—that lawyers are simultaneously capable of partisanship on behalf of 
clients while remaining sufficiently objective to ensure that their own conduct is 
ethical. This assumption, which is referred to here as the objective-partisan 
assumption, can be found in all of the leading theories of legal ethics. 
At the outset, it is important to be clear what is meant by “partisanship” and how 
it differs from the legal ethics concept often referred to as the “partisanship 
principle.”21 Traditionally, the partisanship principle has been understood as one 
aspect of the dominant view of legal ethics—that lawyers should, “within the 
established constraints on professional behavior, maximize the likelihood that the 
client’s objectives will be attained.”22 Put more simply, a lawyer should pursue a 
client’s cause to the full extent the law allows. 
The word “partisan,” however, has a different meaning in social psychology. In 
that context, it is commonly used to describe people who fit the dictionary definition 
of a “partisan,” that is, those who are adherents to, or aligned with, a specific “party, 
faction, cause, or person.”23 So lawyers may be partisans in the social-psychology 
sense (i.e., adhering to a specific party or cause) without complying with the 
partisanship principle (i.e., pursuing that client’s cause as far as the law allows). The 
distinction is significant because critics of the dominant view reject the partisanship 
principle but acknowledge that lawyers are partisans in the sense of being aligned 
with a particular side of a matter.24 Unless otherwise specified, this Article refers to 
“partisanship” in the latter sense. 
                                                                                                                 
 
affecting lawyer behavior); see also infra note 75. 
 19. See generally IDEOLOGY, PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW (Jon Hanson ed., 2012). 
 20. But see Alice Woolley & W. Bradley Wendel, Legal Ethics and Moral Character, 23 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1065 (2010) (describing varied assumptions about human behavior 
implicit in different theories of legal ethics). 
 21. See, e.g., WENDEL, supra note 1, at 6 (listing the “[p]rinciple of [p]artisanship” as one 
of the “two principles that guide the actions of lawyers”); Daniel Markovits, Further Thoughts 
About Legal Ethics from the Lawyer's Point of View, 16 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 85, 109 (2004) 
(“[T]he partisanship principle . . . remains, as Geoffrey Hazard has said, ‘at the core of the 
profession’s soul.’” (quoting Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE 
L.J. 1239, 1245 (1991))); Andrew M. Perlman, A Career Choice Critique of Legal Ethics 
Theory, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 829, 846–50 (2001) (providing an overview of the 
“partisanship principle”). 
 22. See LUBAN, supra note 2, at 12. 
 23. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 904 (11th ed. 2012). 
 24. See LUBAN, supra note 2, at 12–13; SIMON, supra note 2, at 9–10. 
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A. The Dominant View’s Objective-Partisan Assumption 
The dominant view contains several related ideas, but one important principle is 
that lawyers should pursue all lawful and ethical conduct a client requests.25 
Supporters of this approach argue that it is a critical feature of the adversarial 
system,26 or that it is an extension of the agency and fiduciary responsibilities at the 
core of the attorney-client relationship.27 They also argue that the dominant view 
furthers human dignity,28 autonomy,29 due process rights,30 and clients’ trust and 
confidence in their lawyers.31 
The dominant view is conceptually appealing, but it necessarily relies on the 
objective-partisan assumption. According to the dominant view, a lawyer should 
pursue a client’s interests to the full extent the law allows without crossing the line 
between permissible and impermissible conduct.32 This prescription necessarily 
assumes that lawyers are capable of acting as partisans—representing one side of a 
matter—and actually identifying the line between permissible and impermissible 
behavior. Critically, if lawyers cannot consistently and accurately locate that line, 
compliance with the dominant view would produce impermissible conduct more 
often than the theory’s proponents acknowledge and produce the ironic effect of 
undermining rather than promoting the client’s objectives. 
Consider a couple of examples. First, recall the hypothetical at the beginning of 
this Article: a client gives a lawyer several smoking-gun documents that may doom 
the client’s case if produced in discovery, and the client instructs the lawyer to use 
all permissible methods to avoid producing the documents. Under these 
circumstances, the dominant view requires the lawyer to pursue every lawful tactic—
to go right up to the line, but not cross it.33 The problem is that, if the lawyer is 
encouraged to approach a line that the lawyer cannot clearly identify, the lawyer is 
at a heightened risk of engaging in impermissible behavior, such as withholding the 
documents under a frivolous theory of privilege or unresponsiveness.34 Such 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. See WENDEL, supra note 1, at 6; Fried, supra note 1, at 1066; Pepper, supra note 1, at 
614. As explained in more detail above, this principle is sometimes referred to as the 
partisanship principle. See supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing the partisanship 
principle’s meaning in the context of lawyering). To avoid confusion, the Article will continue 
to refer to the partisanship principle as the dominant view, and the word “partisan” will 
continue to be used in the ordinary dictionary sense of the word, which is more common in 
the social psychology literature. 
 26. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 12 (1980); Murray L. Schwartz, 
The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 669, 671 (1978). 
 27. See FREEDMAN & SMITH, supra note 1, at 260. 
 28. Id. at 56–57, 69–70. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. at 25–29. 
 31. Id. at 128–29. 
 32. See LUBAN, supra note 2, at 11–12. 
 33. See W. Bradley Wendel, Busting the Professional Trust: A Comment on William 
Simon’s Ladd Lecture, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 659, 663 (2003) (observing that adversarial 
discovery practice is one feature of the dominant view). 
 34. See Washington State Physicians Ins. Exch. & Ass'n v. Fisons Corp., 858 P.2d 1054, 
1079–85 (Wash. 1993); Beckerman, supra note 3, at 524–34; Gorham, supra note 3. 
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behavior not only threatens the lawyer’s interests, but the client’s as well. For this 
reason, proponents of the dominant view necessarily have to assume that the lawyer 
is an objective partisan—capable of advocating for the client regarding the 
production issue and reliably determining the line between permissible and 
impermissible advocacy. 
Second, imagine a lawyer suspects that a client plans to perjure herself at trial. 
Under the Model Rules, the lawyer is permitted (or required if it is a criminal case) 
to offer the client’s testimony if the lawyer “reasonably believes” the testimony will 
be false.35 In contrast, the lawyer is prohibited from offering the testimony if the 
lawyer “knows” it will be false.36 According to the dominant view, if the client insists 
on testifying, the lawyer should offer the testimony unless the lawyer comes to 
“know” the testimony will be false.37 The problem is that, when acting as a partisan, 
the lawyer is at an increased risk of concluding that she “reasonably believes” the 
testimony is false when she really “knows” it to be false. Again, to avoid this practical 
side effect of the dominant view, theorists necessarily (albeit implicitly) assume the 
lawyer is an objective partisan. 
The objective-partisan assumption also appears in variants of the dominant view. 
In an important recent book, Professor Bradley Wendel argues that lawyers should 
not necessarily pursue all of a client’s “interests” to the full extent that the law allows; 
rather, he contends that lawyers should pursue only a client’s “legal entitlements” 
and only to the extent that those entitlements are “well grounded.”38 Wendel’s 
approach is conceptually distinct from the dominant view, but it too relies on the 
objective-partisan assumption. Namely, Wendel implicitly assumes that a lawyer has 
sufficient objectivity to determine whether a proposition is well grounded even when 
acting as a partisan. This assumption may be sound when the answer is clear (i.e., a 
particular legal proposition is obviously, or obviously not, well grounded). But when 
a legal proposition is closer to the line, such as in the perjury example above, Wendel 
does not discuss if a lawyer will be capable of acting as a partisan and making an 
objective assessment of whether the client’s position is well grounded. 
The point here is not that lawyers will be unable to identify the line separating 
permissible and impermissible conduct in all, or even most, instances when they 
follow the dominant view or its variants. Rather, the claim is that theorists have 
                                                                                                                 
 
 35. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(3) (2013) (prohibiting lawyers from 
offering “evidence that the lawyer knows to be false”). 
 36. Id. 
 37. It is worth noting that some dominant view theorists, such as Monroe Freedman, 
believe the Model Rule should be changed to permit criminal defense lawyers to offer perjured 
testimony. See Monroe H. Freedman, Getting Honest About Client Perjury, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 133, 136 (2008). This prescription for a change to the positive law is beyond the scope 
of this Article. For a discussion of the distinction between using legal ethics theory to inform 
the positive law and using it to guide lawyers’ behavior in light of the extant rules, see Andrew 
M. Perlman, Untangling Ethics Theory from Attorney Conduct Rules: The Case of Inadvertent 
Disclosures, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 767 (2005). 
 38. See WENDEL, supra note 1, at 8. For other recent variations of the dominant view, see 
DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC 
AGE (2008) and Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & Dana A. Remus, Advocacy Revalued, 159 U. PA. 
L. REV. 751 (2011). 
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not acknowledged their reliance on the objective-partisan assumption or analyzed 
its accuracy. 
B. The Critiques of Zealous Advocacy 
Critics of the dominant view also fail to acknowledge the objective-partisan 
assumption,39 resulting in two independent problems. First, as a result of the oversight, 
the critics have not identified a potential weakness in the dominant view—that 
lawyers may be unable to locate the line between vigorous advocacy and impropriety 
in the objective manner that dominant-view theorists assume to be possible. 
Second, and less obviously, the critics do not recognize that they also rely on the 
objective-partisan assumption, causing the prescriptive power of their alternate 
theories to suffer accordingly. Consider, for example, Professor David Luban’s 
critique of zealous advocacy.40 He contends that lawyers should seek morally worthy 
ends using morally justifiable means.41 A lawyer should be able to engage in this 
kind of moral calculus in extreme cases because the ends or means will be obviously 
moral or immoral. The problem is that Luban also assumes that lawyers will be able 
to engage in this analysis in more ambiguous situations. That is, he assumes that 
lawyers are capable of acting as partisans (in the sense of being aligned with one side 
of a matter) while making independent moral assessments about the client’s ends or 
the selected means. In other words, he assumes lawyers are objective partisans. 
Professor William Simon has offered another oft-cited critique of the dominant 
view.42 Simon posits that “[l]awyers should take those actions that, considering the 
relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice.”43 
Lawyers, according to this view, should not pursue their own unique conception of 
justice or morality but should be guided by a concept of justice that is consistent with 
the legal culture’s understanding of the concept.44 
The problem is that Simon assumes that lawyers are capable of making objective 
assessments about whether their conduct is consistent with the legal culture’s 
understanding of justice. For example, prosecutors generally pursue the interests of 
justice. Yet, as explained earlier, they often fail to comply with their ethical and 
constitutional obligations to disclose material, exculpatory information to the 
accused.45 Simon fails to acknowledge that lawyers necessarily interpret what justice 
                                                                                                                 
 
 39. See Nathan M. Crystal, Developing a Philosophy of Lawyering, 14 NOTRE DAME J.L. 
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 75, 89–90 (2000); Hazard & Remus, supra note 38, at 752–53 (offering 
an overview of critiques of the dominant view, none of which focus on the dominant view’s 
failure to consider insights from social psychology); Pepper, supra note 1, at 614 n.7 
(collecting criticisms of the dominant view). 
 40. See generally LUBAN, supra note 2. 
 41. See id. at xxii; see also THOMAS L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAWYERS, 
CLIENTS, AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY (2d ed. 2009); THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A 
CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER: LAW FOR THE INNOCENT (1981).  
 42. See SIMON, supra note 2, at 138–39; William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in 
Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988). 
 43. SIMON, supra note 2, at 138. 
 44. See id. 
 45. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
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requires through the lens of their institutional role and thus may have difficulty 
applying his theory in the manner he prescribes. 
In sum, theories of legal ethics emphasize a number of principles and values, but 
the theories all implicitly rely on an important assumption: that lawyers are capable 
of objectively determining the actions they are supposed to pursue while engaged in 
a role that necessarily entails some degree of partisanship. Whether this assumption 
relies on an accurate model of human behavior is rarely discussed. 
II. LESSONS FROM SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY ABOUT OBJECTIVITY 
Social science research reveals that the objective-partisan assumption is 
problematic. Numerous studies demonstrate that our perceptions are easily distorted 
by the situations in which those perceptions occur and that partisanship can have a 
particularly strong distorting effect.46 These studies offer powerful evidence that 
lawyers will have more difficulty making objective assessments on issues—such as 
whether a course of conduct is legal, moral, or consistent with conceptions of 
justice—than most theorists acknowledge.47 
A. An Introduction to Relevant Concepts from Social Psychology 
In his recent book, Thinking, Fast and Slow, Nobel Prize winner Daniel 
Kahneman explains that we process information in two basic, but distinct, ways.48 
One involves “fast” thinking, which causes us to reach rapid conclusions without 
conscious awareness.49 For example, if a person approaches us quickly with a 
menacing stare, we automatically and unconsciously interpret the person as hostile.50 
No conscious thought is required to perceive the approaching person’s emotional 
state.51 In contrast, our brains process other kinds of information in a slower, more 
deliberate fashion, such as when we try to solve a complex math problem.52 In these 
situations, we consciously direct our attention to a question and search for a 
solution.53 Although Kahneman notes that these two methods of processing 
information are simplifications and often operate simultaneously,54 the concepts are 
helpful in understanding why the objective-partisan assumption is flawed. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. See infra Part II.B. 
 47. Legal ethics theorists tend to assume that lawyers are immune not only to the effects 
of partisanship but also to other situational forces that tend to undermine objectivity, such as 
the range of biases and heuristics described in Part II. This Article focuses primarily on 
partisanship because it is such a central feature of the professional role and has been shown to 
have important effects on perceptions. Legal ethics theories may be incomplete in other 
respects as well. 
 48. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 20–24. 
 49. See id. at 20. 
 50. See id. at 19–20. 
 51. See id. 
 52. See id. at 20. 
 53. See id. 
 54. See id. at 28–30. 
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Consider how “fast” thinking causes us to misperceive simple stimuli, such as the 
size of an object or the sound of a voice. This illusion, created by psychologist Roger 
Shepard, 55 offers a useful illustration:  
 
Figure 1. The Shepard Tabletop Illusion. 
The tops of these tables appear to be different shapes, but they are actually the 
same length and width.56 (To prove it, trace the top of one table and place the tracing 
on top of the other table.) Here, “fast” thinking causes us to misinterpret the image. 
One explanation is that our brains perceive the table on the left as a three-dimensional 
object extending into the distance, so we interpret that image as longer and narrower 
than it really is.57 
Even our hearing can be affected by fast thinking. Consider the McGurk effect,58 
which is created through the use of a video in which someone is shown speaking the 
syllable “ga” repeatedly, but the audio is dubbed so that listeners actually hear the 
orator saying the syllable “ba.”59 Most people who watch the speaker’s lips believe 
that the orator is saying “da,” even though the actual sound is “ba.”60 The accurate 
sound is heard by looking away from the speaker’s lips. As with the tabletop illusion, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 55. See ROGER N. SHEPARD, MIND SIGHTS: ORIGINAL VISUAL ILLUSIONS, AMBIGUITIES, 
AND OTHER ANOMALIES, WITH A COMMENTARY ON THE PLAY OF MIND IN PERCEPTION AND ART 
48 (1990). 
 56. See id. at 46, 48. 
 57. See Christopher W. Tyler, Paradoxical Perception of Surfaces in the Shepard Tabletop 
Illusion, 2 I-PERCEPTION 137 (2011), available at http://i-perception.perceptionweb.com/fulltext
/i02/i0422.pdf. 
 58. See Harry McGurk & John MacDonald, Hearing Lips and Seeing Voices, 264 NATURE 
746, 746–48 (1976). A sample video illustrating the effect can be found easily online. See The 
McGurk Effect, YOUTUBE (July 3, 2006), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aFPtc8BVdJk. 
 59. Audrey R. Nath & Michael S. Beauchamp, A Neural Basis for Interindividual 
Differences in the McGurk Effect, a Multisensory Speech Illusion, 59 NEUROIMAGE 781, 781 
(2012) (providing an overview of research on the McGurk effect). 
 60. See id. 
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our fast brains rely on past information about what we are perceiving (here, the 
movement of lips) and interpret the stimulus accordingly. In essence, basic 
perceptions of sight and sound can be distorted because our fast brains automatically 
(and sometimes erroneously) fill in information for us.61 
Unconscious and automatic cognitive processes, such as heuristics and biases, 
similarly influence our perceptions of more complex situations.62 Heuristics, or 
mental shortcuts, help us navigate the world without the need to assess every new 
situation from scratch.63 For example, heuristics help us to prepare for the person 
with the menacing stare without having to spend valuable time consciously 
appraising the person’s emotional state. If the person is, in fact, a threat, this form of 
fast thinking serves an important function. 
Heuristics and biases, though helpful, also come with a cost: they make us prone 
to mistakes of judgment and perception in a wide range of situations. For example, 
we regularly and unconsciously conform our opinions to the expressed beliefs of 
those around us, even when those beliefs are ethically questionable (also known as 
“groupthink”).64 We are willing to obey an unethical instruction because of 
unconscious cues, such as the clothes someone is wearing or whether the person 
issuing the instruction is perceived as a legitimate authority figure.65 We have 
implicit biases concerning a wide range of personal traits, such as race, gender, 
religion, and physical appearance, even in the absence of any conscious bias or 
                                                                                                                 
 
 61. See id. at 785 (discussing finding that McGurk perceivers demonstrated increased 
neural responses in the left superior temporal sulcus) . 
 62. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 107–95. See generally LEE ROSS & RICHARD E. 
NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1991). 
 63. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 28. 
 64. See generally Solomon E. Asch, Studies of Independence and Conformity: I. A 
Minority of One Against a Unanimous Majority, 70 PSYCHOL. MONOGRAPHS: GEN. & APPLIED, 
no. 9, 1956, at 1. The effect can occur even among skilled professionals. See Dina Badie, 
Groupthink, Iraq, and the War on Terror: Explaining US Policy Shift Toward Iraq, 6 FOREIGN 
POL’Y ANALYSIS 277 (2010) (attributing the change in the Bush administration’s views on and 
eventual invasion of Iraq to groupthink). 
 65. See generally STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL 
VIEW (Perennial Classics 2004) (1974). The premise that clothes, for example, can affect one’s 
willingness to obey instructions has been repeatedly tested and confirmed. See, e.g., Leonard 
Bickman, The Social Power of a Uniform, 4 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 47 (1974) (connecting 
subject’s compliance with orders of uniform-wearing individuals to the belief that uniformed 
individuals have legitimacy); Brad J. Bushman, The Effects of Apparel on Compliance: A Field 
Experiment with a Female Authority Figure, 14 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 459, 
459–62, 464–65 (1988) (finding that compliance rates are higher when an order is given by a 
uniformed individual); Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. 
& CRIMINOLOGY 211, 236 (2001) (“Numerous scholars and even judges have made the very 
basic observation that most people would not feel free to deny a request by a police officer.” 
(citing Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters”—Some Preliminary Thoughts About 
Fourth Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 249–50 (1991) 
(“Common sense teaches that most of us do not have the chutzpuh or stupidity to tell a police 
officer to ‘get lost’ after he has stopped us and asked for identification or questioned us about 
possible criminal conduct.”))). 
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prejudice.66 We have a tendency to interpret information in ways that confirm our 
preexisting views;67 we tend to be unduly optimistic about our prospects for the 
future;68 we miscalculate the frequency of events based on how available they are in 
our memory (the representative heuristic);69 we tend to place a greater monetary 
value on items we own than on items we want to acquire (the endowment effect);70 
and we attribute unwarranted significance to numbers we hear that have no rational 
relationship to decisions we need to make (the anchoring effect).71 These and 
numerous other well-documented heuristics and biases regularly cause us to make 
errors of judgment and perception and to act in ways that are inconsistent with the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 66. See generally MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLINDSPOT: HIDDEN 
BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE (2013); Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA 
L. REV. 1124 (2012) (documenting a range of implicit biases affecting the justice system). An 
increasingly robust literature demonstrates that these biases also affect professionals. See 
Alexander R. Green et al., Implicit Bias Among Physicians and Its Prediction of Thrombolysis 
Decisions for Black and White Patients, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 1231, 1231 (2007) 
(concluding that “physicians’ unconscious biases may contribute to racial/ethnic disparities in 
use of medical procedures such as thrombolysis for myocardial infarction”); Jeffrey J. 
Rachlinski, Sheri Lynn Johnson, Andrew J. Wistrich & Chris Guthrie, Does Unconscious 
Racial Bias Affect Trial Judges?, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1195 (2009) (reviewing implicit 
bias research relating to judges). 
 67. See Charles G. Lord, Lee Ross & Mark R. Lepper, Biased Assimilation and Attitude 
Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence, 37 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 2098, 2098 (1979) (concluding those who have strong 
opinions on complex issues are “likely to examine relevant empirical evidence in a biased 
manner”). Biases can also dictate behavior, which, in turn, may confirm the initial bias. See 
Carole Hill, Amina Memon & Peter McGeorge, The Role of Confirmation Bias in Suspect 
Interviews: A Systematic Evaluation, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 357, 357 (2008) 
(concluding “expectations of guilt can indeed have an effect on questioning style and that this 
in-turn [sic] can lead to a self-fulfilling prophecy effect”). 
 68. See Tali Sharot, Alison M. Riccardi, Candace M. Raio & Elizabeth A. Phelps, Neural 
Mechanisms Mediating Optimism Bias, 450 NATURE 102, 102 (2007) (discussing the 
often-incorrect tendencies of individuals to make “overly confident, positive predictions about 
the future,” and how the brain generates the optimism bias). 
 69. For example, people often believe that homicides occur more often than suicides 
because the media portrays the former with greater frequency than the latter. See Valerie S. 
Folkes, The Availability Heuristic and Perceived Risk, 15 J. CONSUMER RES. 13, 13 (1988); 
see also KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 151–52. 
 70. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 289–99. But see Gregory Klass & Kathryn Zeiler, 
Against Endowment Theory: Experimental Economics and Legal Scholarship, 61 UCLA L. 
REV. 2 (2013) (questioning the endowment effect). 
 71. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 119–128 (discussing the anchoring effect). The 
anchoring effect causes our estimations of a number to be anchored by a random number we 
previously heard. See id. For example, if you were asked whether George Washington was 
more than ninety-three years old at the time of his death, you would typically estimate his age 
at death to be higher than you would if the anchoring question used the age of forty-two 
instead. See id. at 119–20 (using Gandhi’s age in a similar example). Lawyers are subject to 
this effect as well, such as when they negotiate the settlement value of a case. See Dan Orr 
& Chris Guthrie, Anchoring, Information, Expertise, and Negotiation: New Insights from 
Meta-Analysis, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 597, 597–98 (2006). 
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oft-assumed model of human objectivity and rationality.72 Put simply, we have 
“bounded rationality.”73 
A number of scholars have explored the implications of these and related concepts 
for lawyers.74 This literature is increasingly vast and varied, and some scholars (such 
as Professor Donald Langevoort) have spent considerable time over many years 
writing about the subject in the legal ethics context.75 The role of partisanship, 
however, generally receives limited attention.76 This oversight is surprising because 
partisanship is a hallmark of the lawyer’s professional role, has been shown to have 
important effects on human perception and action, and (as explained earlier) is 
assumed by legal ethics theorists to have no effect on lawyer objectivity. 
B. The Partisanship Problem 
This Section reviews existing research on partisanship. These studies reveal that 
partisans have difficulty assessing information objectively and that the 
objective-artisan assumption is problematic. 
The first work in this area was conducted over sixty years ago. In a classic study 
on partisanship, students at Dartmouth and Princeton were shown a film of a 
combative football game between their respective schools in which both teams were 
regularly penalized for various rule violations.77 The students were asked to count 
the number of penalties by each team, classify the penalties as either “flagrant” or 
“mild,” and identify the team that initiated the violation.78 Researchers found that the 
assessments of the Princeton and Dartmouth students were materially different.79 
This study and others like it suggest that group affiliations affect perceptions.80 
                                                                                                                 
 
 72. See generally KAHNEMAN, supra note 6. 
 73. See Herbert A. Simon, Bounded Rationality and Organizational Learning, 2 ORG. 
SCI. 125 (1991). 
 74. See supra note 18. 
 75. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, Ego, Human Behavior, and Law, 81 VA. L. REV. 853 
(1995); Langevoort, supra note 18; Donald C. Langevoort, What Was Kaye Scholer Thinking?, 
23 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 297 (1998); Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers? A 
Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers' Responsibility for Clients' Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75 
(1993) [hereinafter Where Were the Lawyers?]. 
 76. But see Cassandra Burke Robertson, Judgment, Identity, and Independence, 42 CONN. 
L. REV. 1 (2009) (arguing that particular conditions or situational influences may trigger 
partisan biases that cloud a lawyer’s judgment); Paula Schaefer, Harming Business Clients 
with Zealous Advocacy: Rethinking the Attorney Advisor's Touchstone, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 
251, 257 (2011) (using social psychology to show that partisan bias may “shade and distort” 
the legal advice given to a client, how zealous advocacy is actually harmful to clients, and how 
revisions to professional conduct codes can prevent attorneys from turning to the zealous 
advocacy philosophy (quoting Robertson, supra, at 40)). 
 77. See Albert H. Hastorf & Hadley Cantril, They Saw a Game: A Case Study, 49 J. 
ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL. 129 (1954). 
 78. Id. at 130. 
 79. Id. at 130–32. 
 80. See Leon Mann, On Being a Sore Loser: How Fans React to Their Team’s Failure, 
26 AUSTL. J. PSYCHOL. 37 (1974). 
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1. Political Partisanship 
The effect is similar for political partisans.81 In one study, Democrats and 
Republicans were asked to evaluate a particular welfare policy.82 The participants’ 
assessment of the policy turned less on the perceived generosity of the policy and 
more on the party who proposed it.83 The study found that liberal participants tended 
to favor the conservative policy when told that Democrats proposed it, and 
conservative participants leaned towards the liberal policy when told that 
Republicans proposed it.84 Interestingly, both liberal and conservative participants 
claimed they were judging the policy based on its content, so neither side appeared 
to acknowledge partisanship’s influence over their perceptions.85 Thus, as with the 
football study, individual affiliations affected perceptions. 
Another conceptually similar study asked Israelis to assess Palestinian and Israeli 
peace proposals.86 When shown the Palestinian proposal, some subjects were 
(incorrectly) told that the Israelis made the proposal.87 Conversely, when shown the 
Israeli proposal, some subjects were (incorrectly) told that the Palestinians made the 
proposal.88 A control group was told the true identity of the side making each 
proposal.89 The study revealed that Israeli subjects had more positive feelings about 
the Palestinian plan when told that Israelis had proposed it than they did about the 
Israeli plan when told the Palestinians had proposed it.90 In other words, by changing 
the authorship of the plans, Israelis in the study stated a preference for the Palestinian 
plan over the Israeli plan, and vice versa.91 
                                                                                                                 
 
 81. See, e.g., Larry M. Bartels, Beyond the Running Tally: Partisan Bias in Political 
Perceptions, 24 POL. BEHAV. 117, 131 (2002); Geoffrey D. Munro, Terell P. Lasane & Scott 
P. Leary, Political Partisan Prejudice: Selective Distortion and Weighting of Evaluative 
Categories in College Admissions Applications, 40 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 2434, 2445 
(2010); Conor Friedersdorf, This Is Your Brain on Partisanship—Any Questions?, THE 
ATLANTIC (Aug. 2, 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/08/this-is-your-
brain-on-partisanship-any-questions/260518/. 
 82. See Geoffrey L. Cohen, Party Over Policy: The Dominating Impact of Group 
Influence on Political Beliefs, 85 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 808 (2003). 
 83. See id. at 811 (“For both liberal and conservative participants, the effect of reference 
group information overrode that of policy content.”). 
 84. See id. 
 85. See id. at 808, 811–12, 821. 
 86. Ifat Maoz, Andrew Ward, Michael Katz & Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation of an 
“Israeli” vs. “Palestinian” Peace Proposal, 46 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 515 (2002). 
 87. See id. at 521. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. 
 90. See id. at 531–32.  
 91. See id.; cf. Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: 
Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1092 
(2000) (discussing overconfidence bias as it relates to targets of social policies). In another 
study on the “confirmatory” or “self-serving” bias, psychologists found that when two 
groups—one pro-capital punishment and one anti-capital punishment—were shown the same 
factual information about capital punishment, each group claimed that the information 
reinforced its prior beliefs. See id. at 1093 (citing Lord et al., supra note 67, at 2102). 
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Another illustration of the effect can be found in U.S. surveys of attitudes about 
government surveillance programs. A 2013 Pew Research Center and Washington 
Post survey asked U.S. citizens about the National Security Agency’s surveillance 
programs under President Barack Obama.92 An earlier poll had asked about similar 
programs under President George W. Bush.93 The 2013 survey found that, “while 
there are apparent differences between the NSA surveillance programs under the 
Bush and Obama administrations, overall public reactions to both incidents are 
similar.”94 The survey revealed statistically significant differences, however, 
correlating with party affiliation: 
Republicans and Democrats have had very different views of the two 
operations. Today, only about half of Republicans (52%) say it is 
acceptable for the NSA to obtain court orders to track phone call records 
of millions of Americans to investigate terrorism. In January 2006, fully 
75% of Republicans said it was acceptable for the NSA to investigate 
suspected terrorists by listing [sic] in on phone calls and reading emails 
without court approval. 
 
Democrats now view the NSA’s phone surveillance as acceptable by 
64% to 34%. In January 2006, by a similar margin (61% to 36%), 
Democrats said it was unacceptable for the NSA to scrutinize phone calls 
and emails of suspected terrorists.95 
These findings offer yet another example of how partisan bias can affect perception. 
Of course, these kinds of results do not suggest that everyone is subject to partisan 
bias. After all, a majority of people in each political party retained their preexisting 
views on government surveillance regardless of who was in office.96 The point here 
is that political partisanship can affect some people’s perceptions in particular 
situations. 
2. Professional Partisanship 
It is tempting to conclude that the football and political partisan studies are 
inapplicable to professionals (like lawyers) because, unlike sports fans and casual 
political partisans, professionals are more informed about the subject matter of their 
decisions and are trained to maintain their objectivity. Indeed, some research 
suggests, for example, that political partisans are less likely to rely on heuristics when 
they are more politically informed.97 Moreover, even when partisan biases exist, they 
                                                                                                                 
 
 92. See PEW RESEARCH CENTER, MAJORITY VIEWS NSA PHONE TRACKING AS 
ACCEPTABLE ANTI-TERROR TACTIC (2013), available at http://www.people-press.org
/files/legacy-pdf/06-10-13%20PRC%20WP%20Surveillance%20Release.pdf.  
 93. See id. at 2. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 3. 
 96. See Eugene Volokh, “Virtually Unyielding Preference for Partisanship Over 
Principle?”, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 14, 2013, 5:08 PM), http://www.volokh.com
/2013/06/14/virtually-unyielding-preference-for-partisanship-over-principle/. 
 97. See Cindy D. Kam, Who Toes the Party Line? Cues, Values, and Individual 
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often affect only a fraction of individuals.98 These findings imply that knowledgeable 
professionals may be immune (or more fully immune) to partisan influences as a 
result of their knowledge and experiences. 
Existing research, however, does not support this conclusion. Several studies 
demonstrate that lawyers tend to offer different assessments of a case’s value 
depending on which side the lawyers are asked to represent.99 In one study, law 
students were asked to review a litigation case file and imagine they were 
representing one of the two sides.100 Although the facts given to each of the students 
were identical, the students interpreted the facts differently depending on which side 
they represented.101 Similarly, in a more recent study involving moot court 
participants, students overestimated the legal merits of the side they were randomly 
assigned to represent, even at the conclusion of the competition.102 
These findings do not necessarily mean that a significant fraction of lawyers 
would be unable to make ethics-related decisions objectively. When extending the 
above findings to ethical choices, it is important to understand the heuristics 
responsible for the above results. One is the optimism bias, which is the tendency to 
imagine that our futures are going to be more positive (e.g., our health, our future 
wealth) than we should reasonably expect.103 This bias contributes to a lawyer’s 
unduly optimistic vision of a case’s prospects and thus partially explains why a 
lawyer would tend to overestimate the likelihood of succeeding in a particular matter. 
A second important contributing factor, at least in studies where lawyers are asked 
to assess a case’s monetary value, is the endowment effect, which causes us to 
demand more money to part with an item we own than we would be willing to pay 
someone else for the same item.104 This heuristic may help to explain why lawyers 
demand more money to settle cases they “own” (i.e., the plaintiff’s side of a case) 
than they might be willing to pay if they had to “buy” the same case (i.e., by 
representing the defendant). 
If these were the only two heuristics responsible for the perceptions lawyers had 
in the above studies, one might conclude that ethical decision making would not 
necessarily be affected. When making ethical decisions, lawyers are apt to be less 
susceptible to the endowment effect because, typically, there are no explicit 
                                                                                                                 
 
Differences, 27 POL. BEHAV. 163 (2005). 
 98. See Volokh, supra note 96. 
 99. See, e.g., Babcock et al., supra note 9 (finding that lawyers’ assessment of the value 
of a case varies dramatically depending on which side they represent); Zev J. Eigen & Yair 
Listokin, Do Lawyers Really Believe Their Own Hype, and Should They? A Natural 
Experiment, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 239, 239 (2012) (finding that “following participation in moot 
court contests, students overwhelmingly perceive that the legal merits favor the side that they 
were randomly assigned to represent”); Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Pär Anders Granhag, 
Maria Hartwig & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict Case 
Outcomes, 16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 133 (2010) (finding that “lawyers were 
overconfident in their [case outcome] predictions”). 
 100. George Loewenstein, Samuel Issacharoff, Colin Camerer & Linda Babcock, 
Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135 (1993). 
 101. See id. at 145–53. 
 102. See Eigen & Listokin, supra note 99. 
 103. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
 104. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
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monetary valuations to make. Similarly, although the optimism bias may make a 
lawyer unduly optimistic about the outcome of a case, it does not necessarily make 
a lawyer unable to see the line between ethical and unethical conduct.105 
Additional studies, however, suggest that partisanship itself—the mere placement 
of a professional on one side of a potentially disputed matter—can have a distorting 
effect on professionals’ perceptions and judgments, even when the optimism bias 
and the endowment effect are not implicated.106 
Consider, for example, a recent study of auditors at major accounting firms who 
were given hypothetical accounting scenarios and asked to assess the accounting in 
each situation.107 Roughly half the accountants were asked to assume that they were 
retained by the firm they were auditing, while the rest were told to assume they had 
been hired by an outside investor who was considering making an investment in the 
company.108 In each scenario, the auditors were, on average, more likely to find that 
the company’s financial reports complied with generally accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) when they played the role of the company’s accountant than when 
they were assigned to be the investor’s accountant.109 The authors of the study 
reached the following conclusion: 
Participants were placed in partisan roles that gave them a reason to 
desire a certain outcome. When asked then to make neutral judgments, 
they failed to extricate themselves from the influence of their partisan 
roles. It was as if, once they had arrived at a partisan perspective, the 
justifications for that perspective were readily accessible in their minds 
and so held undue sway over subsequent judgments, even when they 
were made in the presence of an explicit goal of impartiality.110 
In sum, the accountants had the same objective task—to determine whether the 
financial statements complied with GAAP—but reached different conclusions 
depending on which client they had been randomly assigned to assist.111 The study 
suggests that partisanship itself is a situational force capable of distorting a 
professional’s perceptions, including judgments relating to legal compliance. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 105. See KAHNEMAN, supra note 6, at 234–44 (reviewing studies showing that some 
experienced professionals are able to make accurate intuitive predictive judgments in certain 
situations). On the other hand, there is reason to question whether experienced lawyers are 
capable of making the kinds of predictive judgments that are necessary for sound intuitive 
decision making across a range of situations. See Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 99, at 
133 (finding that “lawyers were overconfident in their [case outcome] predictions, and 
calibration did not increase with years of legal experience”). 
 106. See infra notes 109 and 113 and accompanying text. 
 107. Moore, supra note 7. 
 108. Id. at 39. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. at 46 (citation omitted). 
 111. Id.; see also Kaye J. Newberry, Philip M.J. Reckers & Robert W. Wyndelts, An 
Examination of Tax Practitioner Decisions: The Role of Preparer Sanctions and Framing Effects 
Associated with Client Condition, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 439 (1993) (finding that accountants are 
more likely to sign a tax return containing a large deduction related to an ambiguous tax issue for 
an existing client than when the accountant is trying to obtain a new client). 
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Several heuristics likely contribute to this effect. For example, as a result of the 
self-serving or confirmation bias, our recollection of information is “biased in favor 
of information that is consistent with the desired conclusions.”112 So when we are 
placed in partisan roles, we tend to filter information in ways that support that 
conclusion (i.e., the conclusion favoring our clients). This effect complicates our 
ability to make objective decisions, such as determining whether our clients are 
complying with existing legal requirements, as in the accountant study above. 
 This research implies not only that professionals, like everyone else, are 
susceptible to partisanship’s distorting influence, but also that there is reason to 
believe that lawyers may be particularly vulnerable to this distortion given their 
institutional function.113 First, unlike the accountants in the above study, lawyers are 
supposed to make the best case for the client’s position. That is, lawyers are supposed 
to take a partisan position, whereas the accountants in the study were not. Second, 
lawyers tend to perceive themselves as objective, which has the counterintuitive 
effect of making them less so. Research reveals that “telling people to be unbiased 
or highlighting their commitment to objectivity fails to reduce bias and may even 
exacerbate it.”114 Because lawyers are trained to be objective, told that objectivity is 
a professional value, and praised for their objectivity,115 this training may have the 
counterintuitive effect of making lawyers less objective and less able to engage in an 
accurate assessment of new information.116 
This effect is even stronger when people’s sense of identity and self-worth is tied 
to their partisan stances. For example, one study revealed that an environmentalist 
whose self-worth is connected to the success of the environmental movement is less 
likely to acknowledge the validity of evidence showing a global disaster is not 
imminent.117 In contrast, an environmentalist is more likely to accept that evidence 
after receiving a self-affirmation unconnected to her role in the environmental 
movement.118 
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Various studies have found that lawyers’ identities and feelings of self-worth 
are particularly likely to be contingent on professional success.119 One scholar has 
found that “lawyers are tremendously prone to insecurity and an unhealthy need 
for status—a likely manifestation of the related law school paradigms around 
contingent self-esteem and comparative worth . . . .”120 These findings imply that 
lawyers who have contingent self-esteem will have greater difficulty accurately 
assessing new information. Because their senses of self-esteem and identity are so 
intertwined with client-favorable outcomes, these lawyers may find it more 
difficult to assess information that tends to undermine their clients’ positions. 
Finally, we might expect lawyers to be more susceptible to bias than the subjects 
of the manufactured situations in the studies cited earlier. In real life, lawyers have 
even stronger incentives to please clients and help them achieve their goals because 
of the financial and professional benefits from doing so. Thus, there is little reason 
to believe that lawyers facing real world ethical issues are more capable of resisting 
the distorting effects of partisanship. 
In sum, existing research suggests that partisanship may jeopardize a lawyer’s 
ability to perceive a client’s situation accurately, give sound advice, and provide 
ethically permissible representation. These dangers do not necessarily require a 
rejection of any particular theory of legal ethics. After all, whether a lawyer follows 
the dominant view or one of the alternatives, a lawyer still functions as a partisan. 
For example, even lawyers who are expressly committed to the pursuit of justice, 
such as prosecutors, are susceptible to the distorting effects of partisanship, as the 
scholarship relating to Brady disclosures indicates.121 
The implications of this research should not be overstated. The studies do not 
show that lawyers’ objectivity will be compromised in all situations or that 
partisanship is the most common reason for unethical behavior.122 Indeed, there 
is an ample and rich literature describing a wide range of reasons for lawyer 
misconduct and professional misconduct more generally.123 Conversely, most 
lawyers are capable of acting objectively and ethically in the vast majority of 
situations. The point is that existing theories overestimate professional 
objectivity and could be improved by incorporating a more realistic 
understanding of lawyer behavior. 
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III. REVISITING THE OBJECTIVE-PARTISAN ASSUMPTION IN LEGAL ETHICS THEORY 
Thus far, this Article suggests that the leading theories of legal ethics have 
unexamined weaknesses that could be addressed by accounting for the ways in which 
partisanship distorts lawyers’ objectivity. Incorporating these behavioral insights can 
benefit legal ethics theories in much the same way as those insights have improved 
neoclassical economics. Part III.A explores the analogy to behavioral economics and 
identifies some possible objections to it. Part III.B then explains where behavioral 
insights are most needed and concludes that they are particularly valuable when 
lawyers encounter factual or legal ambiguities. 
A. An Analogy to Behavioral Economics 
Behavioral economists emphasize that they seek to supplement—not replace—
neoclassical economics.124 Neoclassical economists traditionally assume that people 
are rational, self-interested actors.125 Behavioral economists have shown that human 
conduct varies in predictable ways from this assumed model and that, by 
understanding these variations, it is possible to develop more accurate and useful 
economic theories and policies.126 
In much the same way, a behavioral theory of legal ethics is neither a rejection nor 
an endorsement of any particular theory of legal ethics. Rather, a behavioral theory of 
legal ethics is premised on the idea that lawyer behavior is not as objective or rational 
as theorists typically assume. By understanding why lawyers’ behavior varies in this 
way (e.g., by understanding when and how partisanship distorts a lawyer’s 
perceptions), legal ethics theories can offer more accurate and useful prescriptions. 
This analogy to behavioral economics is not perfect. Neoclassical economics 
offers a descriptive model of human behavior, and its descriptive power can be 
enhanced through the incorporation of behavioral insights.127 In contrast, legal ethics 
theories are essentially normative—they tell lawyers how they should behave rather 
than describing how they do behave. Because these normative theories do not purport 
to describe lawyer behavior, they do not benefit from social science research on 
human behavior in the same way as neoclassical economics. 
That said, behavioral research can inform and improve normative theories. Consider 
normative theories of economics, such as libertarianism,128 socialism,129 or the range 
of economic theories in between. Each of these theories contains normative rather than 
merely descriptive theories of economics, yet they all benefit from behavioral insights. 
For instance, socialism can be (and has been) critiqued on the grounds that it relies on 
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an unrealistic vision of how human beings behave.130 Similarly, it has been suggested 
that libertarianism can benefit from behavioral research through the development of 
policies that retain freedom of choice but “influence choices in a way that will make 
choosers better off, as judged by themselves.”131 Although this notion of “soft 
paternalism”132 is controversial, the point of these examples is that both descriptive and 
normative theories can benefit from behavioral research. 
Similarly, numerous legal theories have benefited from behavioral insights. For 
example, conventional theories of tort law prescribe a set of background principles and 
prescriptions for human behavior in particular contexts, and legal scholars have shown 
that social science insights can improve these conventional concepts.133 Put another 
way, scholars increasingly have found that social psychology helpfully informs 
foundational theories in many areas of law.134 Legal ethics should not be an exception. 
Another analogy from a completely different context can help to explain why ethics 
theories could benefit from behavioral science. Consider an archer whose objective is 
to hit a target. This goal is easily understandable (the archer should try to hit the center 
of the target), but that goal cannot be regularly achieved without understanding how 
extrinsic forces, such as wind or distance, might affect the trajectory of the archer’s 
arrow. Any useful set of prescriptions for archers cannot simply say: “You should hit 
the center of the target.” The archer needs to be told how to do so, including how to 
adjust her aim to account for the range of forces that affect her accuracy. 
 
Figure 2. Partisanship’s Distorting Influence. 
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In much the same way, theorists cannot simply instruct lawyers to pursue justice, 
a conception of morality, or a client’s legal entitlements and expect lawyers to hit 
their targets. Lawyers also must be told how to hit those targets in light of what we 
know about the ways in which forces, such as partisanship, distort the lawyer’s aim. 
A behavioral theory of legal ethics offers this additional guidance and provides a 
critical, but largely unexamined, method for improving existing theories. 
B. Legal Ethics Theory and the Problem of Ambiguity 
Before turning to the question of how theorists might adjust their prescriptions to 
account for situational forces such as partisanship, it is useful to understand when 
these situational forces are most likely to distort a lawyer’s perception (i.e., when a 
lawyer’s “aim” is most likely to be affected). 
Consider the following examples: 
(1) A lawyer is representing the seller of a business and must disclose various 
financial figures to the prospective buyer. The lawyer for the seller begins 
to question the authenticity of the client’s financial figures but is not 
certain that the numbers are actually false.135 
(2) A lawyer must decide whether an important document is responsive to a 
particular document request. The discoverability of the document is 
debatable because the law does not clearly resolve how broadly to 
interpret the document request.136 
(3) A prosecutor who is seeking to convict someone for committing a 
heinous crime comes across arguably exculpatory evidence the defense 
does not have.137 
In each of these cases, the truth is difficult to discern, either because the facts are 
unclear (such as in the case of the financial figures) or the law is unclear (such as 
determining whether particular information is discoverable or exculpatory). These 
situations require the kinds of judgments that, when viewed through the lens of 
partisanship, increase the likelihood that a lawyer will overestimate the accuracy of 
the client’s information or the strength of the client’s legal position. In these contexts, 
social science suggests that lawyers will have more difficulty making the kinds of 
objective decisions existing theories assume.138 For example, studies suggest that 
lawyers are willing to engage in impermissible negotiation tactics because of 
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ambiguities in the law,139 and ample evidence exists that lawyers regularly make 
cognitive mistakes in the third situation above.140 
In contrast, partisanship poses less of a problem when the law or the facts are 
easily discernible. For example, imagine a lawyer receives a document that was sent 
by mistake from opposing counsel and must decide whether to take advantage of that 
mistake. Rule 4.4(b) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct gives the lawyer 
discretion to look at the document, so there is no ambiguity in that regard.141 
Moreover, there is no debate about the facts—the document was sent to the lawyer 
by mistake. Because the facts and the law are clear, existing theories can be applied 
as intended. For example, the dominant view would suggest that, assuming the client 
wants the lawyer to look at the document, the lawyer should do so. Partisanship is 
less likely to cause the lawyer to engage in impermissible conduct under these 
circumstances. 
Other situations may involve legal issues or factual questions that are neither 
ambiguous (as in the three examples above) nor clearly resolved (as in the case of 
the inadvertently sent document). Rather, the legal issues or factual questions may 
strongly, but inconclusively, favor a particular view. In these situations, partisanship 
may have a distorting effect, but not as strong as when the law or the facts are more 
genuinely in doubt. In other words, many (if not most) factual and legal issues are 
neither clear nor unclear; they lie somewhere in between. The point is that 
partisanship is more likely to have a distorting effect as the ambiguity of a legal or 
factual question increases. Or, to use the archer metaphor, partisanship is most likely 
to affect the lawyer’s aim and ability to hit a target when the facts or law are unclear. 
Existing theories fail to account for this effect. Consider, for example, the 
dominant view. Lawyers who adopt it are supposed to pursue a client’s interests to 
the full extent the law allows and must therefore determine what the law actually 
permits. The research on partisanship suggests that a lawyer will have difficulty 
making this determination objectively, especially when the determination turns on 
ambiguous facts or unclear propositions of law, as in the examples above. The result 
is that lawyers in these kinds of situations will be more likely to make mistakes when 
determining what is lawful, thus increasing the risk of crossing the line between 
permissible and impermissible behavior. 
One might think that this problem is one to be solved by rule makers rather than 
dominant-view theorists. After all, if we know that lawyers are going to misinterpret 
the location of the line between permissible and impermissible advocacy, the rules 
might be drafted more strictly to ensure that lawyers steer clear of the behavior that 
is of greatest concern. The problem with this solution is that cognitive biases do not 
affect all lawyers the same way. Moreover, some ethical issues may be ambiguous 
in some situations (say, where the facts are unclear) but quite clear in others. As a 
result, overly strict drafting would unnecessarily deter legitimate conduct. This 
problem, therefore, is not one that can be neatly solved through creative rule drafting. 
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Dominant-view critiques suffer from similar problems. For example, as explained 
earlier, William Simon believes that “[t]he lawyer should take those actions that, 
considering the relevant circumstances of the particular case, seem most likely to 
promote justice.”142 David Luban has criticized Simon for prescribing an 
unrealistically complicated analysis of whether a client’s position is just.143 Simon 
replies that such an analysis is not as complicated as Luban suggests.144 This 
intramural debate over the complexity of the analysis overlooks an even more 
fundamental problem: even if lawyers are able to undertake the kind of analysis that 
Simon prescribes, lawyers are not necessarily able to do so reliably in the context of 
a particular representation. The reality is that lawyers who encounter legal or factual 
ambiguities of the sort described above are more likely to misjudge what constitutes 
a just course of action than Simon’s theory assumes. 
These errors of judgment can be as problematic as those made by lawyers operating 
under the dominant view. For example, prosecutors seek to achieve justice, but their 
partisan role can infect their decision making and cause them to withhold exculpatory 
information that they are constitutionally and ethically obligated to disclose. 
Luban’s approach suffers from the same kind of problem. He proposes that 
lawyers should pursue morally worthy ends using morally justifiable means.145 The 
problem is that, even if moral calculations are easier to make than Simon’s 
sophisticated judgments about justice, there is no reason to believe that moral 
judgments are any more immune from partisanship’s distorting influence than the 
kinds of judgments Simon recommends. Lawyers who are asked to make moral 
judgments in the context of legal or factual ambiguities will have more difficulty 
doing so than Luban’s theory assumes and can make the same kinds of mistakes as 
lawyers who are committed to the dominant view or Simon’s position.146 
This discussion suggests that legal ethics theories should not prescribe a 
one-size-fits-all approach to lawyer conduct (e.g., instructing lawyers to pursue a 
client’s interests, well-grounded legal entitlements, the interests of justice, some 
sense of morality, etc.) Rather, as explained below, prescriptions need to vary 
depending on the ambiguity of the law and facts involved. 
IV. TOWARDS A BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LEGAL ETHICS 
To this point, this Article has suggested that theorists’ reliance on the 
objective-partisan assumption is problematic, particularly when lawyers face factual 
or legal ambiguities. This Part identifies several ways in which existing theories 
could be refined to reflect this reality, such as prescribing more context-dependent 
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behavior, advocating for revisions to certain features of the law of lawyering, and 
encouraging changes to legal education. 
A. Context-Dependent Prescriptions and the Importance of Debiasing 
Legal ethics theories tend to offer a single, unvarying prescription for lawyer 
behavior. These prescriptions, however, fail to account for the ways in which a theory 
may be misapplied in light of partisanship’s distorting influence.147 
Theories of legal ethics can—and should—account for these distortions through 
more context-dependent prescriptions.148 For instance, rather than prescribing the 
same conduct in every situation (e.g., pursuing the client’s interests to the full extent 
the law allows), theorists should acknowledge that lawyers need to adopt a different 
mindset when they are faced with ambiguous legal and factual questions, such as 
those described earlier.149 In these situations, theorists should prescribe debiasing 
techniques that reduce cognitive biases and increase the likelihood that lawyers can 
make more objective and effective decisions.150 Debiasing strategies could include, 
for example, seeking second opinions from more objective observers,151 or explicitly 
writing out the counterarguments to a position.  
The prescription to seek second opinions is particularly attractive because existing 
structures exist to facilitate it. Large firms have general counsel or ethics committees 
that can address ethics-related questions. Similarly, most bar associations have free 
ethics hotlines to answer questions from solo practitioners and lawyers at smaller 
firms. By encouraging lawyers to get these kinds of second opinions in situations 
where cognitive biases are most likely to occur, theorists can increase the likelihood 
that their prescriptions will be applied in the manner intended.152 
Debiasing strategies, though useful, are not panaceas. One important problem is 
that lawyers sometimes have difficulty identifying situations that implicate ethical 
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concerns—a problem known as “ethical fading.”153 This “fading” occurs for a variety 
of reasons, including groupthink, optimism bias, deference to authority figures, and 
the gradual nature in which many ethical problems arise.154 It is also difficult to 
educate people about cognitive distortions because of “blind spot bias,” a bias about 
our own resistance to bias.155 For these and other reasons, debiasing techniques, such 
as encouraging lawyers to seek second opinions in appropriate cases, will not always 
be effective. Nevertheless, by identifying the problem of bias and suggesting useful 
(albeit not foolproof) solutions, scholars can improve ethics theories through more 
realistic prescriptions for lawyer behavior. 
These context-specific prescriptions for debiasing may seem divorced from the 
conceptual world of legal ethics theories, but those theories are only useful insofar 
as they reflect the way lawyers actually behave in practice. By acknowledging that 
lawyers are susceptible to cognitive biases in certain situations and offering context-
dependent remedies, theorists can develop more complete, normatively attractive, 
and empirically justifiable prescriptions for lawyers to follow. 
B. Debiasing Through Substantive Law 
Another promising strategy for minimizing the effects of cognitive bias is to 
develop laws, rules, or legal frameworks to help prevent biased decision making.156 
This strategy of “debiasing through substantive law” is premised on the idea that it 
may offer a less intrusive way to address bounded rationality than flatly prohibiting 
certain choices from being made.157 For example, Professors Christine Jolls and Cass 
Sunstein argue for increasing the percentage of outside directors on corporate boards 
because those directors are less susceptible to cognitive bias.158 This approach is less 
intrusive than, say, restricting or regulating a board’s choices and can have a similarly 
positive effect. This concept of debiasing through substantive law has several 
possible implications for the law governing lawyers, including the increased use of 
law firm discipline and proactive entity regulations. 
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1. Law Firm Discipline 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct currently focus primarily, if not 
exclusively, on the behavior of individual lawyers rather than the firms where those 
lawyers work.159 Professor Ted Schneyer and others have argued that this lawyer-based 
system of regulation could be usefully supplemented by a set of disciplinary rules 
designed to regulate firms themselves.160 A couple of U.S. jurisdictions (New York and 
New Jersey) have adopted a variant of this idea by imposing supervisory responsibility 
on firms themselves and not just specific lawyers.161 
One powerful argument for firm-based discipline is that it is sometimes difficult 
to blame misconduct on any particular lawyer or group of lawyers. For example, the 
cause of misconduct may be inadequate processes and procedures within the firm.162 
Law firm discipline, such as public reprimands or monetary sanctions, can provide a 
mechanism for holding firms accountable in these situations, thus incentivizing firms 
to create more effective structures for ensuring appropriate conduct.163 
A behavioral approach to legal ethics suggests a reason to endorse firm-based 
discipline that has not been previously explored: the structures and systems that 
would insulate the firm against firm-based discipline also might help to protect 
lawyers against cognitive distortions, such as those produced by partisanship. 
A rigorous system of firm-based discipline might incentivize firms to create 
procedures that minimize the likelihood of cognitive errors. For example, firms 
might ask their own lawyers to conduct case or project audits of colleagues. These 
audits might involve a periodic review of a team’s decisions by a non-team lawyer. 
This lawyer-auditor could be instructed to discuss questionable legal and factual 
issues that the team has encountered or inquire about possible ethical dilemmas the 
team failed to raise on its own initiative or failed to see because of ethical fading.164 
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Such audits might help to identify problematic decisions, offer useful feedback, and 
(most critically) protect long-term members of a team from biased decisions by 
introducing an outsider’s fresh perspective. 
Of course, firms could try audits or other debiasing strategies today without a 
regime of law firm discipline. The point here is that law firm discipline might 
incentivize the creation of structures that help to reduce the distorting effects of 
serving in a partisan role. 
As with other strategies, this approach is not a perfect solution. After all, law firms 
already have an incentive to prevent ethical violations because of potential 
malpractice liability.165 Law firm discipline, however, will create incentives to guard 
against ethical problems that might not otherwise give rise to liability. With a realistic 
threat of firm-based discipline, law firms will have a reputational incentive to 
develop new and innovative structures that can more effectively prevent biased 
decision making among lawyers in the firm.166 In other words, the substantive law of 
lawyering can be used to incentivize firms to develop improved debiasing strategies. 
2. Proactive Regulation 
Another possible prescription is proactive regulation. Currently, the U.S. system 
of lawyer regulation is largely reactive in the sense that lawyers interact with it only 
when they are the subject of a complaint. In contrast, a system of proactive regulation 
includes ex ante regulations that help to prevent ethical violations and malpractice 
claims from occurring in the first place.167 For example, one modest way in which 
the United States is proactive is through mandatory continuing legal education 
requirements, which are intended to ensure that lawyers maintain a minimum level 
of competence. 
More elaborate mechanisms are possible, such as conducting routine audits of 
firms to determine whether they have appropriate procedures in place regarding the 
timely “provision of services, avoidance of careless errors, adequate documentation 
of fee terms and billing, timely recognition and resolution of conflicts of interest, 
sound records management, adequate supervision of practitioners and staff, and 
prevention of trust account violations.”168 This kind of system can be found in other 
parts of the world, such as England and New South Wales, and evidence suggests 
that these systems may reduce ethics complaints and malpractice claims.169 
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Behavioral research may help to explain why proactive regulations are effective. 
These regulations increase the likelihood that firms will have appropriate oversight 
mechanisms, such as policies regarding the supervision of lawyers and staff, that 
reduce biased decision making. Again, as with law firm discipline, proactive 
regulation cannot prevent all ethical problems, but it can foster the creation of more 
robust internal regulatory structures that may debias the relevant decision makers and 
reduce the likelihood of inappropriate conduct. 
C. The Role of Discretion in Professional Rulemaking 
Flaws in the objective-partisan assumption also have implications for the structure 
of the profession’s ethics rules as well as the content of related policies. Regarding 
the structure of the rules, one important debate among legal ethicists is whether 
lawyers should be subject to law-like rules, such as those found in the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct, or be afforded more discretion in the exercise of their 
professional duties.170 For example, Professor William Simon has contended that 
lawyers should have more discretion to make ethical judgments than the Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct currently allow.171 
The problem with the discretionary approach is that it assumes lawyers employ 
their discretion in a manner that is consistent with theorists’ prescriptions. As this 
Article makes clear, such an assumption is flawed, particularly when lawyers 
encounter ethics-related issues involving legal or factual ambiguities.172 If the rules 
offer more discretion, the law of lawyering will be even more ambiguous, increasing 
the likelihood that various cognitive distortions will impact lawyers’ behavior. In 
sum, a behavioral theory of legal ethics has implications for theorists’ views on the 
structure of lawyer regulation and suggests that the movement towards law-like rules 
will enhance, rather than detract from, lawyers’ ability to act in ways that are 
consistent with the principles that scholars propose. 
For related reasons, a behavioral theory of legal ethics suggests that rules and 
policies could be revised to eliminate discretion in contexts where there is a 
particularly high likelihood of cognitive error. For example, prosecutors regularly err 
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when making case-by-case determinations about what must be disclosed to the 
accused under Brady v. Maryland.173 This type of cognitive error can be reduced with 
an “open file” policy.174 Such a policy gives the accused access to all information in 
the prosecutor’s file, not just the information an individual prosecutor deems 
exculpatory. Some prosecutors’ offices have experimented with this approach, and it 
has received significant attention among scholars and the popular press.175 Although 
it is not a panacea,176 this approach reflects the kind of practical prescription that 
ensures greater compliance with existing theories of legal ethics. 
D. Teaching Cognitive Bias in Legal Education 
A final way to ensure that ethics theories are applied in the manner scholars intend 
is to educate law students and lawyers about cognitive bias. Although the previously 
mentioned blind spot bias makes this effort difficult, there are several promising 
approaches. One social psychologist has found that, by making people more aware 
of their own lack of objectivity, they can assess new information more accurately.177 
This awareness is particularly effective when people are told about specific 
individuals who have made mistakes due to cognitive errors rather than merely being 
exposed to statistics about cognitive bias.178 There is also evidence that people are 
less susceptible to partisanship’s effects if their identities and senses of self-worth 
are not contingent on the outcome of a partisan fight.179 
These findings suggest that some reforms to legal education might minimize 
partisanship’s effects on judgment. For example, law schools could expose students 
to social science research on objectivity and impartiality to help counter the 
mythology of the lawyer as an objective partisan. Students could also be exposed to 
the stories of specific well-regarded lawyers who engaged in ethical misconduct.180 
This type of instruction could occur in first year lawyering classes, professional 
responsibility courses, clinics, and any other setting where lawyering skills and 
values are taught. This type of education will not provide complete immunization 
against partisanship’s infecting influence, but it can increase the likelihood that 
lawyers will recognize the limits of their own objectivity, employ debiasing 
strategies, and make better decisions. 
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Another option would be for legal educators to help students develop a stronger 
sense of self-worth that is independent of professional and financial success.181 
Some ideas include reducing reliance on the strict Socratic method (i.e., reducing 
methods that are likely to embarrass or intimidate students), actively encouraging 
students to seek out rewarding work instead of the highest paid work, developing 
less demeaning grading curves,182 and urging students to retain their moral 
intuitions instead of only engaging in the relativism-promoting exercise of seeing 
the other side of every legal argument.183 
Yet another option is to teach professional responsibility through simulation 
exercises rather than through the more traditional discussion of cases and 
hypotheticals. By placing students in realistic situations where they have to resolve 
an ethical issue presented to them, they are more likely to learn how to identify 
similar types of problems in practice. 
Again, educating people about cognitive distortions does not automatically produce 
objective partisans. After all, even if we know that the image of the tables earlier in this 
Article is fooling us, it is difficult to see the tables as the same size.184 For conceptually 
similar reasons, we have trouble identifying when we are subject to ethical fading even 
when we are familiar with the concept. Nevertheless, the studies described above 
suggest it may be possible to increase the likelihood that lawyers will identify ethics 
issues accurately when they arise, just as we can learn to recognize that a 
two-dimensional object depicted as a three-dimensional object can cause us to 
misperceive its size. At the very least, theorists should consider how pedagogy might 
ensure greater fidelity to the models of lawyer behavior that they propose. 
CONCLUSION 
Behavioral insights have informed many areas of law, including the field of 
professional responsibility.185 Those insights, however, have had only a modest 
effect on the foundational theories of legal ethics, even though those theories are, at 
their core, prescriptions about human behavior. The reality is that lawyers’ conduct 
cannot be understood, theorized about, or used to produce the best possible 
regulations without an appreciation for the limits on human rationality and 
objectivity. A behavioral theory of legal ethics offers a way to incorporate those 
realties into the foundational debates on a lawyer’s professional role so that scholars 
can produce more useful, normatively appealing, and empirically justifiable models 
for lawyer conduct, regulation, and education. 
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